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aBSTracT
The unprecedented expansion of EU controls on biological materials under the aegis of 
the EU’s expanding remit on public health has caused a major reshaping of the regulatory 
landscape of the life-sciences in Member States. This article analyzes the challenges to 
national and supranational legal orders posed by the integration of ethical norms within 
the EU Human Tissue and Cells Directive 2004/23/EC and the Advanced Therapies 
Regulation (EC) 1394/2007. We show how the infiltration of substantive moral norms 
in morally contested fields of biotechnology is facilitated by the incorporation into the 
EU legislative texts of fundamental norms such as respect for human dignity contained 
in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. The first part of the article sets out the constitutional and 
normative challenges posed by the EU legislative intervention on ethical matters in the 
field of health and new biotechnologies. The second part examines the substantive content 
of the integrated fundamental norms highlighting their open-ended and indeterminate 
character and the areas of overlap and disjunction. The third part introduces an analytical 
matrix which is deployed to analyze the reach of fundamental norms in shaping the more 
specific ethical controls in the legislative texts and reveals how the mix of technical and 
evaluative norms resolves the ethical and constitutional tensions in the EU texts.
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§1. iNTroducTioN
The unprecedented expansion of eu controls on biological materials1 under the aegis 
of the expanding remit of the eu on public health2 has caused a major reshaping of 
the regulatory landscape of the life-sciences in Member States. a considerable body 
of eu scholarship has described and analyzed the multi-level governance character of 
eu intervention on health, highlighting the dynamics of hard and soft law regulatory 
processes in the health field.3 This article focuses instead on the challenges to the 
supranational and national legislations posed by the integration of ethical norms within 
the eu legal framework.
The adoption of two recent pieces of eu legislation, the human Tissue and cells 
directive 2004/23/ec (hereinafter, eucTd) and regulation 1394/2007 of the european 
parliament and of The council on advanced therapy medicinal products (hereinafter the 
aTr) was the result of prolonged political conflict between the eu law-making institutions 
over the eu competence to legislate on ethical matters and sustained pressure from within 
the eu parliament for the exclusion of specific applications of the new technologies on 
ethical grounds.4 whilst these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, the final texts are 
by no-means a gloss-over on ethical norms. we show how the infiltration of substantive 
moral norms in morally contested fields of biotechnology is facilitated by dualities and 
disjunctions in the eu legislative texts including the incorporation of the fundamental 
norms contained in the eu charter of Fundamental rights5 and the council of europe’s 
convention on human rights and Biomedicine (oviedo convention).6
1 See principally directive 2004/23/ec of the european parliament and of the council of 31 March 
2004, oJ l 2004 102/48 (on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, 
testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells), in subsequent 
footnotes EUCTD; commission directive 2006/17/ec, oJ l 2006 38/40 (on donation, procurement 
and testing of human tissue and cells); commission directive 2006/86/ec, oJ l 2006 294/32 (on 
traceability requirements, notification of serious adverse reactions and events and certain technical 
requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and 
cells); regulation (ec) 1394/2007 of the european parliament and of the council, oJ l 2007 324/121 
(on advanced therapies), amending directive 2001/83/ec and regulation (ec) 726/2004, in subsequent 
footnotes aTr.
2 The areas identified under the community public health programme 2003–2008 included health 
information, rapid reaction to health threats and health promotion. after 2008, the strategic areas 
were enlarged to include population ageing, health treats and new technologies.  See the white paper, 
Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008–2013, coM(2007) 630 final.
3 See for example hervey, ‘The european union and the governance of health care’, in g. de Búrca and 
J. Scott (eds.), New Governance and Constitutionalism in the EU and the US, (hart, 2006), 179–210.
4 There were over 120 amendments introduced during the passage of the directive, many directed to 
the exclusion of research on human embryonic tissue and cells. See Farrell, ‘The Body politic: ethical 
concerns regulatory dilemmas and human embryonic Stem cell research in the european union’, 
28(2) Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 2 (2007), 215–227.
5 charter of Fundamental rights of the european union, oJ c 2000 364/01.
6 convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human Being with regard to 
the application of Biology and Medicine: convention on human rights and Biomedicine, oviedo, 
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The first part of the article sets out the constitutional and normative challenges 
posed by the eu legislative intervention on ethical matters in the field of health and 
new biotechnologies. This is instrumental to show the tension between the eu mandate, 
which severely limits the competence of the eu to import ethical restrictions on social 
and economically motivated legislation and the growing infiltration of ethical norms 
in morally contested fields underpinned by ‘pan-european’ human rights7 instruments. 
The second part of the article examines the dualities, disjunctions and indeterminacy 
inherent in the human rights norms, whilst the third part introduces an analytical 
matrix which is deployed to expose how the normative tensions are resolved in the eu 
texts through a mix of technical and normative elements.
§2. The policy coNTeXT For eu acTioN oN 
BioTechNology
The adoption of the eu legislation on human tissue and advanced therapies is part of a 
wider eu strategic initiative to enlarge the community’s field of intervention on social and 
economic matters to include health. an analysis of the preceding legislative interventions 
in the field of health reveals the latent tensions between the legislative imperative to 
confine the import of ethical restrictions into the legislation and the political pressure 
to capture and reflect ethical standards through the imposition of eu-wide technical 
standards on health and safety. yet, as will be seen, a strategic initiative whose legal 
basis pointed to the limited competence of the eu to venture beyond harmonization of 
technical standards to protect public health also carried the potential to act as a vehicle for 
the adoption of a european-wide substantive framework of rules whose reach extended 
beyond the prevention of harm to eu citizen’s health. in some instances, this resulted in 
ethical controls on scientific research in the field of technologies being morally contested, 
in a culturally diverse europe.
The directives on blood and human tissues and the advanced therapies regulations 
were adopted as part of the community’s strategic goal to contain ‘health threats’, defined 
as infectious diseases threatening the health of citizens in europe.8 included amongst 
these, were the transmission of emerging pathogens and the resurgence of others, as 
well as enhancing the rapid and co-ordinated response capability to these threats.9 Since 
1993, eight action programmes on health have been initiated by the commission. The 
4.iV.1997, eTS n. 164.
7 with this we mean human rights that are likely to have an impact in the eu legislation, because 
recognised, directly or indirectly, by eu institutions.
8 See the white paper, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008–2013, coM (2007) 630 
final, 23.
9 ibid. See also, in the overview of the eu health Strategy, the section on health threats at http://ec.europa.
eu/health/ph_threats/threats_en.htm.
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identified priorities originally were health promotion, cancer, drug dependence, aidS 
and other communicable diseases, health monitoring, rare diseases, accidents and 
injuries, and pollution-related diseases.10 They were replaced in 2007 by a new integrated 
programme adopted by the european parliament and the council.11 The new six year 
programme set priorities within a threefold framework including health information,12 
health threats and health determinants.13
The social context for the adoption of the original programme on ‘health threats’ was 
the emergence of hiV and aidS, the re-emergence of tuberculosis and the appearance 
of variant creutzfeldt Jacob disease.14 The commission anticipated that a reduction of 
morbidity and mortality would follow from the ‘added value’ of cross-border community 
surveillance and introduction of strict quality and safety criteria for the handling of 
substances of human origin.15 The strategic aim of containing ‘health threats’ through 
the adoption of community-wide technical health and safety standards, pointed to the 
adoption of legislative measures with a primarily technical orientation.16 Specifically, 
the programme adverted to the number of patients in the eu receiving treatments based 
on biological substances donated by others, including blood, tissues, cells, and whole 
human organs. whilst the programme acknowledged the potential high therapeutic 
value of these substances, the potential risks for the transmission of communicable 
diseases were also underscored. community-wide action to contain cross-border threats 
in this field was justified as contributing to a reduction of risks specifically through the 
adoption of legislation prescribing uniform european standards of quality and safety 
of biological substances, in accordance with the eu remit to ensure that ‘a high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
community policies and activities.’17 yet, the ‘technically’ motivated legal intervention 
carried the potential to become a vehicle for importing ethical restrictions on the use 
of new technologies. The final texts and wording of the substantive norms adopted 
10 decision No 1786/2002/ec of the european parliament and of the council of 23 September 2002, oJ l 
2002 271/1 (adopting a programme of community action in the field of public health: 2003–2008).
11 decision No 1350/2007/ec of the european parliament and of the council of 23 october 2007, oJ  2007 
l 301/3 (establishing a second programme of community action in the field of health: 2008–13).
12 health information aims to develop and establish health monitoring systems through the development 
of health indicators and data collection, analysis and dissemination of information on health. See the 
community public health programme 2003–2008, in the decision No 1350/2007/ec, footnote 11.
13 This is a responsibility shared by national authorities and the commission. See the commission Staff 
working document, accompanying the white paper, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the 
EU 2008–2013, coM(2007) 630 final, stating at the outset that ‘one of the major differences between 
this health Strategy and previous strategic documents on health is that it proposes key cooperation 
mechanisms together with the Member States and stakeholders…’.
14 See the overview of health threats in the eu at http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/threats_en.htm.
15 See the commission Staff working document above, coM(2007) 630 final, 16.
16 ibid, 21.
17 ec Treaty, as amended by amsterdam 1997, oJ c 1997 340/145, article 152(1).
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reveal precisely such an infiltration of ethical norms but in a form which reflects the 
constitutional and political tensions in the realization of the eu mandate.
a. The coNSTiTuTioNal challeNge18
The legal basis of eu legislation in the life-sciences field is attributed to the ‘public 
health’ remit vested on the community by the ec Treaties.19 under article 152 of 
the Treaty of amsterdam20 the community is obliged to ensure that ‘a high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
community policies and activities.’21 The measures taken by the community ‘shall 
complement national policies’, ‘… shall be directed towards improving public health, 
preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to human 
health.’22 The council is mandated to achieve the objectives referred to in article 152 
ec through adopting measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs 
and substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives.23 equally, the mandate of 
the eu to harmonize national laws, let alone national moral norms in the field of public 
health, is limited by the overarching principles of the Treaties.24 yet, whilst the eu is 
competent to legislate and harmonize laws in order to facilitate economic integration 
through the creation of an internal market to facilitate the freedom of movement of 
people, goods and services, the eu is also bound to respect the national identities of 
Member States.25 article 6 of the eu Treaty26 emphasizes that the eu is founded on the 
principles of liberty and democracy27 and shall respect the constitutional traditions of 
Member States28 as well as their national identities.29 Furthermore, in areas which do 
not fall within its exclusive competence the principle of subsidiarity requires that the 
union should only act when the proposed objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can be better achieved by the community.30 The principle of 
18 The term ‘constitutional’ here is use broadly to refer to the set of rules that govern the eu system, 
exercise of the eu institutions authority and relations between the eu and Member States.
19 ex article 129 ec (Maastricht 1992, oJ c 1992 19/1).
20 article 152 ec has a wider scope than article 129 ec. among the areas of cooperation between member 
states, the new article lists not only diseases and major health threats but also, more generally, all causes 
of danger to human health, as well as the general objective of improving health.
21 ec Treaty amended by amsterdam 1997 oJ c 1997 340/145, article 152(1).
22 ibid.
23 although these measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures; ibid, article 152 (4a) ec.
24 Notably article 5 of the ec Treaty (Maastricht 1992, oJ c 1992 191/1).
25 ec Treaty amended by amsterdam 1997, oJ  c 1997 340/145, article 6(3).
26 ec Treaty amended by amsterdam 1997, oJ  c 1997 340/145.
27 ibid, article 6(1).
28 ibid, article 6(2).
29 ibid, article 6(3).
30 ec Treaty (Maastricht 1992, oJ c 1992 191/1), article 5.
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proportionality also requires that any action by the community shall not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.31 as the union is founded primarily 
on the economic goal of facilitating the expansion of a free market through the lifting of 
territorial and cross-border barriers to trade, there is no legal basis under the Treaties for 
concerted eu action aiming directly at harmonization and unification of national moral 
norms.32 Thus, legislative measures adopted by the eu are subordinate to the goal of 
economic (and to some degree social integration too)33 but not moral integration, itself 
subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
yet, the legal reality as to the possible intrusion of moral norms into eu law is somewhat 
more complex, since moral norms may nevertheless be indirectly incorporated into eu 
law whose primary goal is to facilitate economic and social integration through a variety 
of direct and indirect legal means, in addition to extra-legal means such as the funding 
of research under the eu research Framework program.34 in particular, indirect legal 
integration or approximation of moral norms may, for instance, be achieved through the 
incorporation of human rights instruments in the eu lisbon Treaty,35 the opinions of 
the european group on ethics, and the jurisprudence of the european court of Justice. 
alternatively, or in addition, legislative instruments may contain ethically or morally 
oriented provisions which are ancillary to the goal of achieving freedom of goods and 
services, albeit subject to the overarching legal requirement to respect the national identity 
of Member States. This includes the right of Member States to protect their national 
identity through the adoption of measures involving restrictions on movement of goods 
or services in order to protect constitutionally enshrined values (article 3036). hence, 
the assimilation of moral norms within the eu constitutional fabric carries the potential 
to expose and heighten tensions in the balance between the eu’s prerogative to impose 
uniform standards in the community and the degree of autonomy retained by Member 
States. The resolution of these tensions in the texts, we argue, is effected through the 
incorporation of overlapping, indeterminate and diverging pan-european fundamental 
norms and a combination of more specific technical and normative elements explored 
through an analytical matrix in section 4.
31 ibid.
32 unlike the council of europe, for instance, the european union’s aim is not to ‘achieve greater unity 
between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are 
common to their heritage’. See article 1, chapter 1, Statute of the council of europe (1949), eTS n. 001. 
economic and social progress are also stated as additional objectives, but with no indication of any 
particular economic orientation.
33 For example d. dinan, Ever Closer Union, (palgrave MacMillan, 2005), see generally chapter 14.
34 hervey, ‘The european union and the governance of health care’, 197.
35 ec Treaty, as amended by lisbon 2007, oJ c 2008 115/13, article 2.
36 See the consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the european union, oJ c 2008 115/47, 
article 36 (ex article 30 Tec): ‘The provisions of articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions 
or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; …’.
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B. The NorMaTiVe challeNge
The identification of european-wide moral norms consistent with the plurality and 
diversity of ethical cultures in europe poses a formidable challenge for the drafting of 
specific legislation in morally contested fields such as the regulation of new technologies 
on human tissue, cells and advanced therapies. There are deep social and cultural 
divisions in europe, and indeed within the eu Member States on morally sensitive 
issues such as the use of certain types of human tissue or cells for therapeutic purposes. 
The controversies are focused to a large extent, but not exclusively, on the use of human 
embryonic cells, with considerable opposition within large sectors of european states 
to such uses.37 aside from the controversies relating to the exclusion of certain types 
of tissues or cells, there is as yet no consensus in europe either on the requirements of 
‘informed’ consent, whether the consent should be generic or specific and specifically 
whether donors should be able to veto or dictate the use of donated tissue. The aspiration 
to offer a distinctive ‘european’ answer to and resolution of these normative questions 
thus poses a number of challenges.
in the first instance, the formulation of a distinctively european ethic must avoid 
the charge of ethnic/sectional/regional bias. one of the difficulties with the idea of a 
distinctive European regional morality,38 as opposed to a set of legally recognized and 
enforceable norms amongst eu Member States, is that the european ideal seems prima-
facie potentially inconsistent with the aspiration to universality of ethical and moral 
discourse.39 ethical norms and principles are characteristically unbounded by ethnic, 
territorial or temporal limits.40 This is reflected in the language of ethical codes and legal 
instruments imposing duties or vesting rights on ‘everyone’, ‘each individual’, ‘no person’, 
irrespective of geographical location in space or time, both in international instruments 
such as the universal declaration on human rights and in european instruments.41 For 
instance, article 2 of the echr proclaims that ‘everyone has a right to life’ whilst article 
14 of the echr underscores the universal reach of the provision with the requirement 
that the rights in question ‘… shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’42 
37 See infra, §4, sections B and c.
38 To be captured, for instance, by institutions such as the european group on ethics.
39 See generally, for instance, r. Macklin, Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical 
Universals in Medicine, (oup, 1999).
40 acknowledgement of the universal character of moral norms in no way involves a denial of cultural 
and social diversity. as noted by Macklin, empirical facts disclosing variations between cultures and 
societies do not compel the conclusion that what is right or wrong can be determined only by the beliefs 
and practices within particular cultures: r. Macklin, Against Relativism, (oup, 1999), 178.
41 See generally o. o’Neill, Loosening the Bounds of Human Rights Global Justice and the Theory of Justice, 
(cup, 2000).
42 article 2 of the uNdhr similarly proclaims that ‘… no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, 
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Just as there are serious conceptual difficulties in elucidating the meaning of european 
citizenship without importing exclusionary and discriminatory sectarian racial and 
national criteria, there are parallel challenges in the identification and elaboration of a 
set of moral norms which are distinctively ‘european’.43
Secondly, the search for overarching ethical values cutting across the diversity of 
european cultures carries the risk of generating principles at a level of generality 
which potentially divests or empties them of any substantive content or meaning.44 
overarching fundamental values such as human dignity embedded in international and 
regional instruments have famously been dismissed by scholars as empty or ‘useless’ 
and open to judicial manipulation.45 Both the eucTd and aTr endorse directly or 
indirectly fundamental principles and norms such as ‘human dignity’ and autonomy.46 
a crucial question is to what extent the fundamental overarching ethical principles in 
the eu legislative instruments are accompanied by and reflected in concrete, non-empty 
provisions imposing meaningful specific legal obligations on eu Member States.
whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.’ 
For a detailed discussion of the universal character and reach of human rights principles in the field 
of research trials in developing countries, see generally  Fidler, ‘“geographical Morality” revisited: 
international relations, international law, and the controversy over placebo-controlled hiV clinical 
Trials in developing countries’, 42 Harvard International Law Journal 299 (2001).
43 For a sustained critique of the potential undertone of exclusions and discrimination lurking in the 
concept of european citizenship see generally: e. Balibar, We the People of Europe? Reflections on 
Transnational Citizenship, (princeton university press, 2004). The lisbon Treaty will for the first 
time allow the eu to accede to the council of europe, and therefore provide a legal basis for the 
jurisprudence of the ecthr to be binding on the eu. So, the effect of the lisbon Treaty is arguably 
to enhance the status of the echr. however, the complication arises from the parallel recognition of 
the charter, whose jurisdiction falls on the ecJ (which, incidentally, had hitherto freely drawn from 
the jurisprudence of the ecthr). Juridically, this creates the potential for disjunction and conflict, as 
indeed has been noted by this commentator. The eu’s legal value is encapsulated in what is conceived 
as a form of metaconstiutionality, which is to ensure political cohesiveness of the union, should be 
emphasized here. in line with habermas’ thinking, the broader purpose of the metaconsitutional 
structure in not a creation of anything beyond the historical capacity of the human intellect, but a 
conservation of the ‘great democratic achievement of the european nation-state, beyond its own limits’. 
See habermas, ‘why europe Needs a constitution’, 11 New Left Review 5 (2001), 6.
44 This is a problem attached to the elaboration of principles or norms at a high level of generality. See 
generally a. plomer, The Law and Ethics of Medical Research: International Bioethics and Human Rights, 
(routledge-cavendish, 2005) and r. Macklin, Against Relativism, (oup, 1999).
45 See generally for instance, Macklin, ‘dignity is a useless concept’, 327 BMJ (2003), 1419–1420; and 
ashcroft, ‘Making Sense of dignity’, 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (2005), 679–682. whilst christopher 
Mccrudden has argued that the concept of human dignity does not provide a principled basis for 
judicial understanding in the sense that there is little understanding of what human dignity requires 
substantively: Mccrudden, ‘human dignity and Judicial interpretation of human rights’, 19 European 
Journal of International Law 4 (2008), 655–657.  For a defence of the principle, see pellegrino, ‘The 
lived experience of human dignity’, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the 
President’s Council on Bioethics (The president’s council on Bioethics washington, d.c. March 2008), 
available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/human_dignity/chapter20.html.
46 See infra § 3.
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a further complication arises from the fact that the eu legislative instruments refer to 
a number of regional instruments whose substantive normative content is not identical. 
This includes notably the council of europe’s convention on human rights (1950)47, 
the council of europe’s convention on human rights and Biomedicine (1997)48 and the 
eu charter of Fundamental rights (2000).49 yet, the inclusion in an eu legislative text 
of instruments adopted separately by the eu and the council of europe, obscures the 
duality of jurisdiction between the european court of Justice (over the charter) and the 
european court of human rights (over the council of europe’s Treaties) and the potential 
for legal and normative disjunctions on the authoritative interpretation of the principles 
and rights protected under each instrument.50 The jurisdictional duality is of special 
significance because it carries the potential to exacerbate further the existing normative 
disjunctions, indeterminacies and ambiguities in the substantive principles formulated 
in the separate instruments, which are further analyzed in the next section.51
§3. FuNdaMeNTal NorMS aNd diSJuNcTioNS iN 
europeaN huMaN righTS iNSTruMeNTS
a close analysis of the fundamental norms contained in the european human rights 
instruments incorporated in eu legislative texts reveals the inherent ambiguities, 
overlap and disjunctions in the substantive content of norms such as human dignity, 
bodily integrity and prohibition on financial gain, guiding the interpretation of the more 
specific or second order ethical constraints such as consent on uses of human tissue, 
cells and advanced therapies specified in the directive and regulations. in this section, 
we focus specifically on the human rights instruments expressly acknowledged in the 
eucTd and aTr, notably the oviedo convention (Section a) and the eu charter of 
Fundamental rights (Section B). we show how the reaching of a moral consensus on 
first order, overarching fundamental principles such as human dignity is facilitated by 
the incorporation of indeterminate and open-ended moral norms preserving the right of 
member states to align the moral parameters of local and national moral cultures on uses 
of human tissue and cells to the fundamental norms. in Section 3, we show how these 
47 convention for the protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by protocol 
No. 11, rome, 4 November 1950, eTS n. 005.
48 convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human Being with regard to the 
application of Biology and Medicine: convention on human rights and Biomedicine, oviedo, 4 april 
1997, eTS n. 164.
49 charter of Fundamental rights of the european union, oJ c 2000 364/01.
50 See generally williams, ‘The (im)possibility of the european union as a global human rights regime’, 
in r. Brownsword (ed.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, (oup, 2004). also, S. c. greer, The 
European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, (cup, 2006).
51 ratification of the lisbon Treaty is not a foregone conclusion. at the time of writing, for example, a 
referendum in ireland had rejected the ratification of the Treaty. Negotiations to ‘rectify’ the outcome 
of the referendum are still under way.
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first order fundamental principles guide the flexible interpretation of the more specific 
second order ethical norms contained in the legislative texts and combine with technical 
controls analyzed through the lens of an analytical matrix deployed in section 4.
according to the european commission, the human Tissue and cells directive 
2004/23/ec (hereafter, the eucTd)52 was adopted after extensive consultation with 
institutions like the council of europe and the world health organization and was 
intended to be consistent with a range of human rights instruments in the field.53 The 
preamble to the eucTd specifically recalls the european convention of human rights 
(1950), and states that the oviedo convention54 and additional protocols are ‘taken 
into account’, whilst the substantive provisions are intended to be ‘consistent with’ 
the charter of Fundamental rights of the european union.55 Similarly, the advanced 
Therapies regulation 2007 (hereafter, the aTr)56 proclaims respect for the fundamental 
rights and observance of the principles reflected in the charter of Fundamental rights of 
the european union and ‘takes into account’ the oviedo convention.57 These different 
wordings could indicate that the charter’s ‘guiding influence’ takes priority over the 
oviedo convention and its protocols; the provisions in the directive and regulations are 
expressly intended to be ‘consistent with’ or ‘observe’ and ‘respect’ the rights enshrined 
in the charter but not necessarily those enshrined in the convention which they have 
merely ‘taken into account’. The enhanced status of the charter vis-à-vis the convention 
is further reinforced in the subsequent commission directive on quality and safety 
procedures which, as well, recalls only the charter.58
52 eucTd.
53 See commission directive 2006/17/ec, oJ l 2006 38/40, recital 6: ‘This directive is based on 
international experience drawn upon through an extensive consultation, the council of europe’s 
guide to safety and quality assurance for organs, tissues and cells, the european convention on 
human rights, the council of europe’s convention for the protection of human rights and dignity 
of the human Being with regard to the application of Biology and Medicine: convention on human 
rights and Biomedicine (oviedo, 4.iV.1997), with its additional protocols, and recommendations from 
the world health organization. in particular, with regard to further additional biological testing for 
donors originating from high-incidence areas of specific diseases or whose sexual partners or parents 
originate from high-incidence areas, Member States will refer to existing international scientific 
evidence. The directive is consistent with the fundamental principles set out in the european charter 
of Fundamental rights.’
54 convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human Being with regard to 
application of Biology and Medicine: convention on human rights and Biomedicine (oviedo, 
4.iV.1997), eTS n. 164.
55 eucTd, recital 22. The directive also recognizes the role of the opinions of european group on ethics 
in Science and New Technologies (ege) in evaluating all ethical aspects of biotechnology. The directive 
states that ege’s opinions have been taken into account while drafting the directive (recital 33).
56 regulation (ec) 1394/2007 of the european parliament and of The council, oJ l 2007 324/121 (on 
advanced therapy medicinal products and amending directive 2001/83/ec and regulation (ec) 
726/2004).
57 aTr, preamble, article 8.
58 See commission directive 2006/86/ec, oJ l 2006 294/32, recital 12: ‘This directive respects the 
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of Fundamental 
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whether or not there is an intended hierarchy, the fundamental norms enshrined 
in both the council of europe’s human rights instruments and the eu charter, as 
will be seen, are central to the interpretation of the more specific, second order ethical 
values contained in the eu legislation further analysed in Section 4. The analysis of the 
fundamental norms underpinning these instruments discloses the ambiguities and 
disjunctions in the key fundamental norms.
a. The couNcil oF europe coNVeNTioN oN huMaN righTS & 
BioMediciNe
The overarching fundamental or higher order values asserted in chapter i of the council 
of europe convention on human rights and Biomedicine (oviedo convention) include 
‘ the dignity and identity of all human beings’, the non-discrimination and respect for 
integrity, and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of 
biology and medicine’ (article 1). The primacy of the human being over the sole interests 
of science (article 2), the equitable access to health care (article 3) and the requirement 
that any intervention in the health field should be carried out in accordance with 
relevant professional obligations and standards (article 4). More specific, ‘second-order’ 
values are detailed in the ensuing chapters: specifically, ‘consent’ (chapter ii), ‘privacy 
and right to information’ (chapter iii), ‘organ and Tissue removal’ (chapter iV) and 
prohibition of financial gain (chapter X). The specific rules in each chapter have to be 
read consistently with the statement of general values and purpose of the convention 
stated in the first chapter of the convention.59
according to the explanatory report: ‘The concept of human dignity … constitutes the 
essential value to be upheld. it is the basis of most of the values in the convention.’60
yet the concept of human dignity, although central to the echr and international 
human rights instrument generally, is to a large extent under-determined and open 
to conflicting interpretations depending on whether it is grounded in the individual’s 
capacity to make autonomous choices, thus entailing that respect for human dignity 
requires respect for the individual’s exercise of autonomous choices (human dignity as 
liberty/empowerment)61 or alternatively whether human dignity is grounded in natural 
rights of the european union.’.
59 Note that the drafting committee agreed that the term ‘human being’ should be understood in its 
widest sense and avoided the inclusion in the framework convention of a definition of the human 
being; they also did not specify whether the framework convention applies to the human being only 
after birth or also before, and whether the framework convention also applies to gametes and genetic 
engineering; they did not to include a definition of bioethics, the difference between the latter and 
medical deontology being sufficiently well established. Nevertheless, the explanatory report gives some 
details on the concept of bioethics. See explanatory report to oviedo convention, dir/Jur (97)5, 5.
60 ibid, para.10.
61 The core idea was originally advanced by i. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (wilder, 
2008) and developed in the twentieth century in a. gewirth, Reason and Morality, (university 
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attributes of the individual or human species imposing an obligation not to alter or modify 
human life (human dignity as constraint).62 This second reading of human dignity as 
constraint is evident in the explanation of the drafters of the oviedo convention that 
many of the current advances of science, particularly genetics, pose a risk not only to the 
individual himself or society, but to the human species. hence, the explanatory report 
states ‘the convention sets up safeguards, starting with the preamble where reference is 
made to the benefits of future generations and to all humanity, while provision is made 
throughout the text for the necessary legal guarantees to protect the identity the human 
being.63 The dual and contrasting liberal and paternalistic meanings of ‘human dignity’ 
present in the oviedo convention reflect a similar duality in third generation human 
rights instruments such as uNeSco declaration on the human genome64 and the 
latest uNeSco declaration on Bioethics.65
The two contrasting conceptions of human dignity have radically opposed implications 
for the framing of eu ethical norms on biotechnology, depending on whether the 
libertarian or paternalistic perspective is followed. For instance, the requirement for 
the informed consent in article 5 or privacy and right to information in article 10 
of the oviedo convention may be rooted in the higher-order value and overarching 
requirement to respect human dignity, where human dignity is understood in liberal 
terms as a fundamental principle requiring respect for the capacity of individuals to 
make autonomous choices.66 on the other hand, the prohibition on financial gain in 
article 21 sets constraints on organ and tissue removal in article 19 and the exclusions 
and limits on uses of human embryos for research purposes in article 18, are arguably 
of chicago, 1978). Neo-Kantian applications to new biotechnologies include d. Beyleveld and r. 
Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, (oup, 2001).
62 For an incisive analysis of the contrast between human dignity as empowerment and human dignity as 
constraint, see generally Feldman, ‘human dignity as a legal Value’, Public Law (1999), 682–702. See 
also wheatley, ‘human rights and human dignity in the resolution of certain ethical Questions in 
Biomedicine’, 3 European Human Rights Law Review (2001), 312–325.
63 explanatory report to the echrB, dir/Jur (97) 5, para. 14; see records of the general conference 
of paris, 21 october to 12 November 1997 (uNeSco 1998), available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/
ev.php-url_id=13177&url_do=do_Topic&url_SecTioN=201.html. in ascribing rights and 
dignity to the human species as a whole, the council of europe’s convention on human rights and 
Biomedicine stands apart from both first and second generation human rights instruments, which 
have traditionally sought to protect the negative and positive socio-economic rights of individuals and 
society, respectively.
64 where there are no less than 16 references to human dignity. See Feldman, ‘human dignity as a legal 
Value’, 682–702.
65 See records of the general conference of 19th october 2005 (uNeSco 2006), available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180e.pdf.
66 as the explanatory report states, this article deals with consent and affirms at the international level 
an already well-established rule, that no one may in principle be forced to undergo an intervention 
without his or her consent. human beings must therefore be able freely to give or refuse their consent to 
any intervention involving their person. This rule makes clear patients’ autonomy in their relationship 
with health care professionals and restrains the paternalist approaches that ignore the wish of the 
patient. See the explanatory report to the echrB, dir/Jur (97) 5, para. 34.
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grounded on a paternalistic understanding of human dignity justifying State interference 
with an individual’s autonomous choice either to protect the individual from himself or 
to uphold values said to be inherent in a human being or the human species as a whole.
B. The eu charTer oN FuNdaMeNTal righTS
The eu charter of Fundamental rights67 is both structurally and in terms of content 
different from the oviedo convention as regards the fundamental values identified and 
their ordering. The preamble to the eu charter states that the union is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity and 
emphasizes that the goal of developing these common values is to be pursued alongside 
respect for diversity of cultures and constitutional traditions of Member States.
The charter is divided into six chapters ‘dignity’, ‘Freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘Solidarity’, 
‘Justice’, ‘citizens rights’. The counterpart norms to those in the oviedo convention 
come mostly under the umbrella of the chapter entitled ‘dignity’ which, in other leading 
human rights instruments is traditionally part of the preamble.68 By contrast, human 
dignity in the charter is enshrined in article 1 of the text, stating that human dignity 
is inviolable and must be respected. whilst this could be read as signifying that human 
dignity is to be treated a right in itself,69 in the absence of further specific obligations 
flowing from the right70 and the preamble’s alignment of human dignity with other 
universal values of freedom, equality and subsidiarity, the more natural reading instead 
is that human dignity is to be understood as the overarching value underlying the more 
specific rights or second order values detailed under the chapter of the same name. These 
include the ‘right to life’ (article 2), the ‘right to the integrity of the person’ (article 3) 
and the prohibition of torture (article 4) and slavery (article 5). article 2 of the charter 
is based on the same provision as article 2 of the echr.71
By contrast, article 3 introduces a distinct right to integrity of the person without 
direct counterpart in the oviedo convention or the echr.72 at the same time, the right 
67 charter of Fundamental rights of the european union, oJ c 2000 364/01.
68 For instance, the 1948 universal declaration of human rights enshrined this principle in its preamble, 
first paragraph: ‘whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.
69 as suggested, in the explanatory notes: ‘The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental 
right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights’. See the explanations relating to the 
charter of Fundamental rights, oJ c 2007 303/17.
70 Feldman, ‘human dignity as a legal Value’, 682–702.
71 explanatory report to the echrB, dir/Jur (97) 5, 7.
72 echr, article 3 – right to the integrity of the person. 1. everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
physical and mental integrity. 2. in the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected 
in particular: the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures 
laid down by law, the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of 
persons, the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain, the 
prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
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to integrity enshrined in article 3 captures some of the rights specified in the convention 
under separate discrete clauses. The consent requirement in article 3(2) of the charter 
maps unto article 5 of the oviedo convention prescribing the need to obtain a person’s 
free and informed consent before any intervention in the health field. The prohibition on 
making the human body and its parts a source of financial gain mirrors exactly article 
21 of the convention, whilst the prohibition of reproductive cloning of human beings 
has no direct counterpoint in it. instead the counterpart is to be found in the protocol of 
the oviedo convention.73 Thus, the rights subsumed in the chapter 1 of the eu charter, 
on human dignity, reflect the ambivalent dual nature of the principle in the oviedo 
convention both facilitating individual choice through the right to informed consent 
but constraining individual autonomy through restraints on commercialization of the 
human body and excluded uses of reproductive technologies. Significantly, the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data in the charter is subsumed under the chapter 
on Freedoms.
§4. aNalyTical MaTriX
From a constitutional perspective, the more specific and determinate the formulation 
of fundamental principles and rights enumerated in the charter, echr and oviedo 
convention, the greater the degree of moral convergence or integration required 
amongst the varying moral and legal cultures of Member States of the european union. 
conversely, the more open-ended the formulation, the greater the margin of discretion 
left to Member States to align their distinctive moral and legal cultures to the enumerated 
general principles.74 For instance, the prohibition on cloning in article 3(1)2 of the eu 
charter extends only to reproductive cloning, reflecting the unanimous view of Member 
States, but not to therapeutic cloning on which Member States are divided. Thus, the bar 
for exclusion of contested technologies on ethical grounds is very high, as it requires a 
high degree of normative convergence between the moral cultures of Member States. 
conversely, general and open-ended principles and norms facilitate the co-existence of 
a diversity of more specific norms and rules reflecting the different national moral and 
legal traditions of member states.
in this light, it is not surprising that the ‘higher-order’ fundamental ethical values of 
freedom/autonomy and dignity in the charter and oviedo convention are mirrored, but 
only in part, in the texts of these eu directive and regulations. The modulating factor is 
73 additional protocol to the convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human 
Being with regard to the application of Biology and Medicine, on the prohibition of cloning human 
Beings (1998), eTS n. 168.
74 See for instance the (controversial) declaration on human cloning, adopted in uN general 
assembly, resolution 56/93 of 12 december 2001 (united Nations declaration on human cloning a/
reS/59/280).
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the tension between the limits to the eu mandate, which is not supposed to harmonize 
ethical standards and the growing pressure of fundamental principles, as reflected by 
the express acknowledgement of human rights codifications in the preambles of the 
eucTd and the aTr. as a result, the ethical norms contained in the eucTd and aTr 
can be analyzed according to a tri-partite matrix along two axes reflecting the level of 
prescription of eu norms (viz. from strictly mandatory to optional) and the degree of 
normative variability permitted (viz. from uniform to flexible).
a. The regulaTory MaTriX
The form and content of ethical norms contained in the eucTd and aTr can be 
analyzed according to a tri-partite matrix identifying the mix of ethical or evaluative/
non-evaluative elements in the texts. at one end of the spectrum, the eucTd and 
the aTr introduce eu-wide ethically motivated75 but essentially scientific technical, 
uniform standards which are fixed and are strictly obligatory.76 at the other end of the 
spectrum norm or value based, ‘ethics’ driven regulation in transnational contexts sets 
standards and norms in an open-ended, aspirational, flexible form allowing for a high 
degree of variability in the interpretation and determination of specific rules or norms in 
order to accommodate a plurality and diversity of ethical perspectives. in between strict, 
measurable uniform standards and aspirational open-ended norms/values, a middle 
third way involves a mix of mandatory but loosely constrained, open-ended, flexible 
ethical norms. The character of the controls introduced the eu texts may be analyzed 
against the matrix to reveal the mix of ethical and non-ethical controls. The tri-partite 
matrix may thus be mapped against the following regulatory modes:
1. Techno-Regulation
The underlying regulatory model in this case aims to be ‘value-neutral’ and freed from 
the variability and uncertainty attending ethical, political or social values. The goal is 
to rationalize, manage and control harm to health through the adoption of uniform, 
scientific and value-free ‘risk-based’ standards. The ultimate ambition is to facilitate the 
development of measurable indicators and uniform detailed technical rules or procedures 
transcending national boundaries and ensuring compliance within a sector.77 Standards 
75 Viz. protection of public health.
76 See infra: Techno-regulation.
77 yet, the comparative histories of risk-based regulation in the developed economies of the uS, uK 
and germany, suggests that the view of risk-based regulation as a complete value-free enterprise is 
somewhat removed from the complex reality. in the case of gM crops, in particular, the boundary 
between scientific ‘facts’ and political/social values has proved to be less hard and more permeable than 
the ideal model suggests.
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are strictly enforceable and mandatory and typically enforceable through regulatory 
agencies.
2. Higher-Order Normative Regulation
By contrast, ‘normative regulation’ is based on ethical, political or social values attended 
with different degrees of variability. at one end of the spectrum, normative principles 
may be open-ended, moral, aspirational ideals, of potentially fuzzy and indeterminate 
semantic application. higher-order fundamental values such as equality, solidarity or 
dignity specified in the preamble or non-binding part of international or regional human 
rights instruments are the clearest examples.78 often, such general and open-ended 
ethical norms are legally ‘soft’ and even when contained in binding part of the legal 
instrument may allow for considerable flexibility in the interpretation and determination 
of specific obligations.79
3. Second-Order Normative Regulation (Mixed)
‘Second-order’ values specify more determinate ethical norms which are derivative 
from higher-order norms or principles. Their form or content is therefore less open-
ended and may constrain but in a flexible form. For instance, ethical norms such as 
consent requirements or data protection are typically derivative from the higher-
order overarching principles of freedom/autonomy or human dignity, but the precise 
determination, content or form of implementation may be left open. The matrix table 
thus looks like this:
Matrix Table
higher-order Normative 










an analysis of the ethical controls in eucTd and of the aTr according to the above 
matrix reveals the regulatory and legislative mix relied upon by the eu to navigate 
78 For example, the preamble to charter states that ‘the union is founded on the indivisible, universal 
values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’.
79 See infra, section B.
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through and resolve the potential tensions in the integration of a morally and culturally 
diverse europe.
B. huMaN TiSSue direcTiVe (2004/23/ec)
concerns over the lack of a regulatory framework at eu level on medical uses of human 
tissue began to emerge in 1998 in the context of the adoption of the eu directive on in 
vitro diagnostic medical devices80 which excluded human viable tissue from its scope. 
There were three reasons justifying the exclusion: a) the lack of control at procurement 
level; b) lack of authorization and inspection of the establishment involved in tissue and 
cell’s procurement; c) and non-binding standards on quality and safety of the biological 
material. on that occasion the commission stressed the need for specific legislation in 
the field. Moreover, the european group on ethics in the same year also declared the 
need to regulate the way tissue and cells circulate in the internal market, although on 
ethical basis. The first draft of the directive was issued in 2002 and the final text adopted 
in 2004. The directive applies ‘to tissues and cells including haematopoietic peripheral 
blood, umbilical-cord (blood) and bone-marrow stem cells, reproductive cells (eggs, 
sperm), foetal tissues and cells and adult and embryonic stem cells’.81 it does not apply 
to a) ‘autologous draft within the same surgical procedure’, b) blood and blood cells, 
c) organs. it expressly excludes from its remit in vitro research.82
The directive had a turbulent passage through the eu parliament, when a coalition of 
Mps primarily from the christian democrat and green groups attempted to insert into 
the legislation amendments banning embryonic stem cell applied research and tissue 
transplants involving material derived from embryonic stem cells. The amendments 
highlighted to divisions and contested nature of the european moral norms on embryo 
research. The attempts to exclude and restrain uses of this technology in the directive, 
on the basis of respect for human dignity, were ultimately narrowly defeated.83
By contrast, differences amongst Member States on restraints regarding payment for 
tissues or cells were neutralized in the directive through the adoption of a general open-
ended norm enjoining Member States to ‘take the necessary measures to encourage 
voluntary and unpaid donations of human tissues and cells with a view to ensuring 
that, insofar as is possible, they are obtained from such donations’. as Farrell notes, the 
significant shift lies in the alteration from the original mandatory language stipulating 
80 directive 98/79/ec of the european parliament and of the council of 27 october 1998, oJ l 1998 331/1 
(on in vitro diagnostic medical devices).
81 eucTd, recital 7.
82 eucTd, recital 11: ‘does not cover research using human tissues and cells […outside the human 
body…] e.g. in vitro research or in animal models’.
83 See the report on the eucTd proposal, 25 March 2003, final a5–0103/2003. Most of ‘ethical’ 
amendment herein proposed by the parliament were rejected. in particular, see amendment 14, 
which suggests ‘Member States should try to create a code of conduct…[that provides for]… a ban on 
producing human embryos with the same genetic data as another human being’.
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that Member States ‘shall take’ the necessary measures to encourage voluntary donations, 
to the aspiration that States ‘shall endeavour’ to take the necessary measures. This is 
the clearest example of the aspirational type of regulation, as described by the previous 
section.
on the other hand, the directive introduces mandatory, uniform and fixed norms in 
relation to safety standards for the procurement of human tissue and cells, destined to 
human application. it stipulates the obligations of the authorities within Member States, 
like supervision of the procurement process, accreditation, designation, authorization or 
licensing of tissue establishments, inspections and controls, traceability, import/export 
of human tissues and cells, registration of establishments, notification of serious adverse 
events and reactions.84 it further sets provisions for the quality and safety of tissue and 
cells, and it set requirements for the responsible person, the personnel, tissue and cell 
reception, and processing and storage. Moreover, it adds labelling requirements and rules 
on the relationship between the establishment and third parties.85 Finally, the directive 
tackles exchange of information between member states and the eu commission, 
reports and penalties regarding the implementation of the directive86 and deals with 
the committees, which, at the same way as in the Blood directive, are mandated to issue 
detailed regulations on the above discipline.87
in between the aspirational ideals and the prescriptive technical, health related criteria, 
the directive incorporates a number of ethically motivated controls and prescriptive but 
flexible ethical norms relating to donor selection and data protection.88 For instance, 
an annex to the directive specifies the information to be given to living donors and 
representatives of deceased donors. There is a noticeable difference between the part a of 
the annex, reserved to living donors, and the part B, reserved to deceased donors. part 
a details the information that has to be provided to the donor,89 and stipulates that ‘[t]he 
information must be given by a trained person able to transmit it in an appropriate and 
clear manner, using terms that are easily understood by the donor’.90 it further states that 
‘[t]he donor must be informed that he/she has the right to receive the confirmed results of 
the analytical tests, clearly explained’.91 conversely, annex B on deceased donors merely 
84 eucTd, chapter 2.
85 ibid., chapter 4.
86 ibid., chapter 5.
87 ibid., chapter 6.
88 ibid., chapter 3.
89 ibid., annex.4. The donor must be informed that he/she has the right to receive the confirmed results 
of the analytical tests, clearly explained.5. information must be given on the necessity for requiring 
the applicable mandatory consent, certification and authorisation in order that the tissue and/or cell 
procurement can be carried out.
90 ibid., annex a.2.
91 eucTd, annex a.4.
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states that all information and the confirmed results of the analysis of the tissue have to 
be communicated in accordance with the legislation of Member States.92
Moreover, as regards consent, the human Tissue directive is supplemented by 
the eu commission directive 2006/17/ec93 on donation, procurement and testing of 
human tissue and cells, which sets out detailed requirements to ensure health and safety 
of both donors and prospective beneficiaries of the relevant therapies. The commission 
directive intended to detail the provision of a directive of the parliament and of the 
council, mostly stipulates mandatory and uniform norms. however, it also specifies 
that before the procurement an authorized person must confirm and record that consent 
has been obtained in accordance with article 13 of the eucTd.94 article 13 defers to 
the legislation of Member States on consent. Moreover, the commission directive also 
mandates the legislation of Member States to respect the dispositions of the annex 
which, in the case of living donors are detailed as regards form, but in the case of 
deceased donors are again redirected to the legislation of Member States. in either case, 
the directive leaves open the substantive content of the consent requirement as regards 
the ethically contested question of whether consent as to future uses of the tissue or cells 
should be generic or specific after a long series of forwarding commands, therefore, the 
commission directive leaves part of its regulations open and flexible, for Member States 
to draft their own legislation.
as for data protection, the directive asks Member States to take ‘all necessary 
measures’ to protect personal data collected in the application of the directive, and to 
protect the identity of the donors against recipients and vice versa, in observance ‘without 
prejudice to legislation in force in Member States on the conditions for disclosure, notably 
in the case of gametes donation’.95 it does not give further details on the nature of those 
measures, if not with the general indication that data security measures should be in 
place96 and procedures are set against the discrepancies of data.97 as regards consent 
and protection of personal data, therefore, the eucTd imposes mandatory norms, 
but leaves to Member States the detailed determination of the specific obligations. The 
above shows that the eucTd tackles the most delicate ethical matters in the parts of the 
directive that are the middle ground between open-ended aspirational declarations and 
prescriptive norms.
92 ibid., annex B 1–2.
93 commission directive 2006/17/ec, oJ l 2006 38/4.
94 ibid., annex 4 1.1.1(a).
95 eucTd, article 14.3.
96 ibid., article 14.2(a).
97 ibid., article 14.2(b).
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c. regulaTioN oN adVaNced TherapieS 1394/2007 aMeNdiNg 
MediciNe direcTiVe (2001/83/ec)
The new regulation on advanced Therapies 2007 (aTr)98 was adopted to fill another 
regulatory gap in the complex structuring of eu controls on medicinal products and 
extends legislation covering pharmaceuticals, medical devices, gene therapy and somatic 
cell therapy to advanced therapies based on tissue engineering and tissue engineered 
products. The aTr covers tissue engineered products (Teps) which fall within the 
definition of medicinal products, grouping together gene therapy and somatic cell 
therapy medicinal products as ‘advanced therapy medicinal products’ (aTMps).
The new regulation on ‘advanced therapy medicinal products’ was introduced to fill 
the gap between the directive on Medicines (directive 2001/83/ec)99 and the eucTd 
in order to regulate the use of engineered tissues for therapeutic purposes.100 in addition 
to the setting of uniform manufacturing, quality and pharmacovigilance standards 
to protect eu citizens’ health, the regulations extend to aTMps the centralized eu 
procedure for marketing authorization previously applicable to pharmaceuticals101 
through the european Medicines agency (eMea).
The new advanced Therapies regulation was adopted by the european parliament in 
april 2007, approved by the council on the 30th of May 2007. it is has been in force since 
30th december 2008. The passage of the legislation through the european legislative 
institutions was all but peaceful, with an attempt, once again, to use the regulations as 
a vehicle to exclude morally contested biotechnologies. The committee for legal affair 
(Jure) proposed several amendments, among which two particularly controversial. 
amendment 17, reciting:
This regulation shall not apply to advanced therapy medicinal products that contain or are 
derived from human embryonic or foetal cells, primordial germ cells or cells derived from 
those cells.102
and amendment 3, stating:
This regulation should prohibit any authorisation of products derived from human-animal 
hybrids or chimeras or containing tissues or cells originating or derived from human-animal 
98 aTr.
99 directive 2001/83/ec of The european parliament and of the council of 6 November 2001, oJ l 2004 
311/67 (on the community code relating to Medicinal products for human use).
100 proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on advanced Therapy 
Medicinal products and amending directive 2001/83/ec and regulation (ec) 726/2004, coM(2005) 
567 final.
101 commission directive 2003/94/ec, oJ l 2005 91/13 (setting manufacturing requirements to be applied 
to investigational medicinal products) and regulation (ec) 726/2004 of the european parliament and 
of the council,  oJ l 2004 136/1.
102 report on the aTr proposal, a6–0031/2007 final.
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hybrids or chimeras. This provision should not exclude the transplantation of somatic animal 
cells or tissues to the human body for therapeutic purposes, in so far as it does not interfere 
with the germ line.103
The above evidences show the continuing pressure within the european parliament 
to have ethical restrictions on uses of embryonic or hybrid materials in the legislation. 
But the attempts failed and the ethically contested clauses were ultimately left out. 
paradoxically, had the exclusions been incorporated into the legislation, the effect would 
have been to leave advanced therapies based on the use of the morally excluded tissues 
outside the reach of the regulatory controls on quality and safety standards introduced 
to safeguard the health of eu citizens.
The new regulation on advanced therapy medicinal products aims at laying 
down: uniform technical standards on quality and safety of bioengineered products; 
centralized procedures for marketing authorisation through the eMea;104 and uniform 
procedures on post-authorization pharmaco-vigilance.105 The aTr also creates a new 
european interdisciplinary advisory expert committee on aTMps, or ‘committee for 
advanced Therapies’,106 responsible, inter alia, for preparing scientific expert opinions 
on the quality, safety and efficacy of each advanced therapy medicinal product for final 
approval by the eMea,107 and for consulting and liaising with the committee for 
Medicinal products for human use.108
Most of the dispositions of the aTr, which is a lex specialis to eu directive 2001/83/
ec, are mandatory and aim at harmonising technical standards on health and safety 
across Member States. They are therefore typical examples of the ‘techno-regulation’ 
model involving mandatory, uniform standards enforced through a regulator (the eMea) 
as described in our matrix. For example, the aTr mandates Member States to ensure the 
traceability of the components of a medicinal product during the whole manufacturing 
process,109 especially for products deriving from human tissue and cells;110 it introduces 
prescriptions in on pharmacovigilance relating to follow-up of the efficacy, adverse 
reactions and risk management of these products;111 it also introduces incentives for 
the small/medium sized enterprises. in its annexes, moreover, the regulation introduces 
fixed and mandatory prescriptions regarding labelling, including most notably ‘ethically’ 
driven labelling as discussed above.112
103 ibid.
104 aTr, charter 3.
105 ibid., chapter 5.
106 ibid., chapter 7.
107 ibid., article 8(2).
108 ibid., article 8(1), article 8(3).
109 ibid., article 15.
110 ibid., article 14(3).
111 ibid., article 14.
112 ibid., annex ii.
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The second-order, flexible normative principles on consent and privacy regarding 
donation and procurement of tissues and cells contained in the eucTd are imported 
into the aTr in article 3. Similarly, on the previously ethically contested question of 
the centrality of altruism/non-payment in relation to sourced tissues and cells, the aTr 
follows the compromise-wording of the eucTd. The aTr uses aspirational language 
enjoining – but falling short of requiring – voluntary and gratuitous donations on the 
grounds that this ‘may’ contribute to the quality and safety of the material itself.113 The 
aspiration is further softened by its inclusion in the preamble only, with no counterpart 
mention in the binding part of the text. Thus, whilst the preamble states that ‘[a]s a matter 
of principle, human cells or tissues contained in advanced therapy medicinal products 
should be procured from voluntary and unpaid donation’ and ‘Member States should 
be urged to take all necessary steps to encourage a strong public and non-profit sector 
involvement in the procurement of human cells or tissues’,114 there is no obligation or 
corresponding enforcement procedure or penalty for Member States that opt to depart 
from the altruistic model. as regards payment for commercial trade in human tissue 
and cells, the ethical norms contained in the aTr conform to the normative open-ended 
model of regulation.
Finally, on the constitutionally sensitive and ethically contested question regarding 
the adoption of an eu-wide policy on controls relating to the use of human embryonic 
or animal cells on which european Member States are divided, the aTr follows the 
eucTd approach, by avoiding any position. Notwithstanding the strength of a broad 
pan-european political spectrum combining primarily christian democrats and green 
Meps opposing the use of human embryos in research, the attempts to force moral 
exclusions in the eu legislative texts ultimately failed. Member States are left free to 
adopt restrictive rules reflecting national cultures115 on ‘the use of any specific type 
of human or animal cells, or the sale, supply or use of medicinal products containing, 
consisting of or derived from these cells’.116
The legal concession to the moral integrationists in europe in the aTr comes in the 
form of a requirement regarding labelling. Following the precedent set over labelling of 
gMo products, article 29 and annex iii of the regulation imposes a strict obligation 
on labelling of aTMps products, specially requiring that the label contain not only a 
description of the active substance(s) but a statement that ‘This product contains cells of 
human/animal [as appropriate] origin together with a ‘short description of these cells or 
tissues and of their specific origin, including the species of animal in cases of nonhuman 
origin [emphasis added]’. it is not difficult to anticipate a number of difficulties in 
specifying in a publicly accessible manner the precise nature and content of the sourced 
materials. This is no doubt an area in which the newly created advisory committee will 
113 ibid., recital 15.
114 ibid.
115 aTr, recital 7.
116 ibid., article 28(3).
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have a central role to play. The practical outcome, however, is a legal slide of the ‘normative’ 
dimensions of the model into the ‘techno-regulation’ model, as the ethically driven 
labelling requirements fall to be monitored and enforced by the central regulator.
§4. coNcluSioN
The above analysis shows that the eu deals with ethical and constitutional tensions in the 
regulation of morally contested new technologies through the adoption of ‘mixed’ forms 
of legislation which, we have suggested, may be mapped against an analytical matrix 
revealing a mix of evaluative and non-evaluative elements. The matrix distinguishes 
between technical standard-setting norms driven by medico-scientific problems relating 
to health and safety and overarching ‘first order’ fundamental norms incorporated from 
european human rights instruments and guiding the formulation of more specific ‘second 
order’ norms introducing flexible ethical restrictions on the use of the ethically contested 
technologies. within the matrix, these norms range from compulsory to optional and 
their formulation from rigid to open-ended flexible wording, the substantive content of 
which has been left to the discretion of Member States.
our analysis thus shows that whilst the original constitutional framework of the 
european union points to ‘techno-regulation as the favored mode of regulation, 
ethically motivated regulation has taken-off in the field of new biotechnologies and their 
application in biomedical contexts. eu health policy, whilst primarily focused on risk 
management and prevention in healthcare, to be achieved through health and safety 
value-free regulations, has had to respond to political pressure to situate the legislation 
within an ethical frame. This has been achieved through the incorporation of the largely 
open-ended and indeterminate norms contained in overlapping and disjointed eu 
human rights instruments which in turn guide the flexible and more specific ethical 
constraints contained in the legislative texts.
The controversy over the inclusion and control of the ‘morally’ contested technologies 
in the regulation of biotechnological therapies in europe, therefore, shows the delicate 
and complex interface of the formally limiting constitutional framework of the european 
union as regards respect for State autonomy as against the political reality of the forces 
seeking moral integration in europe and representing Member States in the tri-partite 
institutional legal order, most notably the european parliament. as the pace of advance 
in the biosciences quickens and novel and ethically contested applications emerge, the 
eu will continue to face fundamental challenges to the coherence and integrity of its 
legal architecture in its attempt to reconcile respect for ethical diversity and plurality 
with continuing political pressure for moral integration in europe.

